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experience rating account with benefits paid under such circumstances.
Patently, the employer's fault or lack of fault should not enter into the
determination. 32
6. Causes of Unsuitability Personal to the Claimant. While it has
been stated that the cause for the unsuitability must be found in the
work itself and not in the domestic or personal situationc 3 it is sub-
mitted that causes personal to the claimant should be held sufficient.
Suitability is a relative matter in which the effect of the work upon the
claimant and his normal economic activity and activity in society
should be considered. Thus, where a claimant would have been re-
quired to leave her child alone were she to take a job on a particular
shift, such job is unsuitable for her.
Even were it to be admitted that the suitability provision required
that the cause must be found in the work itself, the requirement that
disqualification may only occur where the refusal is without good cause
provides a basis for questioning a narrow view. It seems patent, for
example, that the impossibility of leaving one's children should con-
stitute good cause for a refusal.34
Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct
KATHERINE KEMPFERt
ALL the American unemployment compensation laws contain dis-
qualifications for voluntary leaving and discharge for misconduct.
Under the original laws, with few exceptions, the disqualifications
took the form of a postponement of benefits. However, the number
of states which, in addition to postponing benefits, also reduce the
claimant's maximum benefit amount has been steadily groi.ng.1
32. See Simrell, Employer Fault vs. General Wdfare as the Basis of Uncaployment
Compensation, page 181 infra.
33. In Ben. Ser. 8995-N.H. R(V7-12) it is stated: "The cause for refusing the work
must be because of the work itself and not because of a domestic situation." In Ben. Sur.
9215-Ga. A (VS-3), the referee held ". . . that for good perzonal reasons not connected
with the work [a claimant] refused to accept suitable work and is, therefore, subject to a
disqualification for the week in which he refused the transfer and 4 additional week.:., vith
two times his weekly benefit amount charged against his available credits."
34. Of course, under some such circumstances one may be held una-ailable.
t Attorney, Federal Security Agency.
1. Voluntary leazing: As of December 31, 1937, 45 states merely poztponed benefits
while five also reduced or cancelled benefit rights. (At that time New York had no volun-
tary quit disqualification.) As of September 30, 1944, the number of states in the latter
group had increased to 20.
Misconduet: As of December 31, 1937, 44 states merely postponed benefits and 6x
added reductions or cancellations of benefit rights. As of September 30, 1944, the latter
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Theories of Disqualification.
Various theories of the purpose of such disqualifications have been
suggested: to penalize and thereby discourage commission of the dis-
qualifying acts; to limit benefits to risks which can be insured on a
sound actuarial basis; to limit the risks to involuntary unemployment
due to lack of suitable work.
Penalty Theory. Some of the present disqualification provisions,
particularly those canceling wage credits and reducing maximum
benefits, are so severe as actually to be penalties. As penalties, how-
ever, they are logically inconsistent with aliy theory of punishing or
discouraging the commission of specified acts, since of those persons
who commit the disqualifying acts only those who seek unemployment
benefits ai-e punished. Unemployment compensation laws do not
apply statutory sanctions to voluntary quitting and misconduct as
such, but only in connection with claims for benefits. Moreover, under
American traditions of individual freedom, the proposition that gov-
ernment should not attempt to tie a worker to his job through pressure
exercised by law (except in time of war) seems hardly debatable. While
workers are undoubtedly discouraged to some extent in seeking changes
of employment by fear of loss of rights to unemployment benefits, this
is not and should not be the primary purpose of disqualification pro-
visions.
Actuarial Theory. The actuarial theory attempts to explain the
voluntary-quit and misconduct disqualifications as based on estimates
of tax collections and the cost of insuring various risks. Where the
funds available are not sufficient to pay benefits for all unemployment,
there is a logical justification not only for limiting the maximum dura-
tion of compensation but also for paying benefits to the most deserving
(not necessarily the neediest) unemployed persons and excluding the
least deserving. The voluntary-quit and misconduct disqualifications
may represent a rough attempt to make such a separation. However,
the place where the line is drawn does not seem to have been based on
any mathematical determination. At the time the acts were originally
group had increased to 21 states. At the time of writing, legislative sessions are still il
progress in a number of states. Among the 1945 amendments available, there are no addi-
tional provisions for reduction or cancellation of benefit rights. Minnesota no longer cancels
wage credits and West Virginia has modified its law to permit restoration to the original
maximum benefit amount when a claimant who has been disqualified for voluntary leaving
or misconduct returns to work in covered employment during his benefit year. Oregon,
however, increased the length of its disqualification from a discretionary period of three to
five weeks to all weeks subsequent to the leaving or discharge until the individual has earned
at least $50 in subsequent bona fide employment and has been employed in subsequent
bona fide employment in two separate weeks. Reductions in benefits vary from one or more
weeks to complete cancellation of all wage credits earned from the employer whose service
the individual left or by whom he was discharged. South Dakota does not suspend benefits
but cancels all wage credits earned from the separating employer.
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drafted, reliable data on which to base estimates of the cost of insuring
various risks was scanty; census figures used by the Committee on
Economic Security in estimating costs of benefits were classified solely
by relative duration of unemployment, although some attempt was
made to estimate the number of unemployed persons who would be
disqualified under suggested provisions.2 While there thus seems to
have been very little statistical basis for the original disqualification
provisions, there is even less actuarial foundation in the case of amend-
ments. During a period in which unemployment was steadily decreas-
ing and the size of the state funds constantly groing, there was never-
theless a trend toward harsher disqualifications.
Causal Theory. The most generally accepted theory is that the dis-
qualifications for misconduct and voluntary leaving, like the disqualifi-
cation for refusal of suitable work and the availability requirement,
are intended to carry out the general purpose of unemployment com-
pensation to pay benefits to persons involuntarily unemployed due to
lack of work or unemployed "through no fault of their own1.M." 3 It is
reasoned that where a.worker has become unemployed through his
own act, his unemployment at least for a limited period can be said
to be due to that act. That the misconduct and voluntary leaving
disqualifications grew out of the general purpose of paying benefits to
persons involuntarily unemployed seems sound. The tracing of the
initial cause of the unemployment to the voluntary act of the worker
does not, however, explain the limitations on the disqualifications.
At present no state disqualifies all workers who quit work voluntarily
or are discharged for an act which they knew would result in discharge.
In the great majority the misconduct disqualification is limited to
discharge for misconduct connected with the work. 4 The voluntary
2. 'Williamson, State Actuarial Problems in Unemployienl Comp-nsalion (1936)
3 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROB. 36.
3. SOCIAL SECURiTY BOARD, NnTH ANNUAL RErORT (1944) 10; BAI=xE, INsunsNCE
OR DOLE? (1935) 52-6; DOUGLAS, STANDARDS OF U.NEnPLOYM.mz.T Iz;srunAcx (1933) 62-4.
See also REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY (1935)
11,21.
4. Forty-four states as of the close of the 1943 legislative cessions. Five other statute3
use substantially equivalent language-discharge for misconduct occurring in the courz2 of
the individual's work (Connecticut, District of Columbia); discharge attributable solely to
deliberate misconduct in wilful disregard of the employing unit's interest (Delaware, Masza-
chusetts); discharge for misconduct connected with the work or for misconduct which
interferes with and adversely affects his employment (Minnesota). Ohio disqualifies in
cases of discharge "for just cause connected with the individual's work." Prior to 1945,
Pennsylvania had no statutory disqualification for discharge for misconduct, but the com-
mission of an act which the worker knew would result in discharge v-as there construed to
be a voluntary quit. See, e.g., Ben. Ser. 8855-Pa. R (V7-10). See also Department of
Labor and Industry v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 148 Pa. Supr. 246, 24 A. (2d)
667 (1942), Ben. Ser. 7465 (V5-7). The South Carolina statute vas amended in 1945 to
broaden the disqualification from misconduct connected with the work to miEconduct
"found by the commission to have constituted reasonable grounds for discharge."
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leaving disqualification is limited in many states to voluntary leaving
without good cause and in the others to voluntary leaving without
good cause "attributable to the employer," "involving fault on the
part of the employer," or "connected with the individual's work."'
Where the worker's discharge is due to an intentional act which he
knows will result in dismissal, the causal connection between the act
and the unemployment immediately following exists regardless of
whether or not the act was misconduct connected with the work.
Similarly, whenever the worker's reasons for quitting a job are not so
compelling as to make his leaving involuntary, there is a causal con-
nection between his act and his immediate unemployment regardless
of his reason for quitting.
The "good cause" limitation on the voluntary quit disqualification
and the "connected with the work" limitation on the disqualification
for discharge for misconduct seem to have been based, not on a strictly
logical analysis of the voluntary or involuntary character of either the
initial or the continuing unemployment, but on broader social con-
siderations. Unemployment compensation is limited to "involun-
tary" unemployment because public opinion would not support the
payment of benefits as a matter of right to persons "voluntarily"
unemployed. But public opinion is not concerned with metaphysical
theories of causation or free will. People are shocked at the payment
of benefits only when the conduct which led to the claimant's unem-
ployment was unreasonable, that is, when the claimant was "at fault."
Most people would object to payment of compensation to individuals
who have arbitrarily quit work or who have deliberately disobeyed
rehsonable working rules of the employer. On the other hand, probably
everyone would agree that it is reasonable for a worker to quit when
his own health is in danger or when he is needed at home to care for a
sick member of his family, and that it is reasonable for a woman to
marry even though her employer has a rule against retaining married
women. In such cases most people would not be shocked by the pay-
ment of benefits to those individuals when they again become avail-
able for work but are unable to find work. One of the factors which
influences, consciously or unconsciously, the popular judgment as to
whether a claimant should be entitled to unemployment benefits is
whether his conduct is consistent with a genuine desire to work and
5. As of the close of the 1943 legislative sessions, 32 states had an unlimited good
cause provision. At that time, ten states restricted good cause to causes attributable to
the employer, one (West Virginia) to causes involving fault on the part of the employer,
and six to causes connected with the individual's work. Connecticut imposes a disqualifica-
tion for leaving work "without sufficient cause which is either connected with his employ-
ment or is, solely by reason of governmental regulation or statute, beyond his control,"
The Ohio disqualification applies to voluntary quits "without just cause in connection with
his work."
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to be self-supporting or whether it indicates that the claimant is seek-
ing to take advantage of his benefit rights in order to have a "vaca-
tion" from work.
In order to give effect to generally accepted views of social policy
regarding justification for quitting work and behavior as an employee,
it is essential that the voluntary-leaving disqualification recognize
good personal cause for quitting work, and that the misconduct dis-
qualification be limited ,to misconduct connected with the work.
Individuals who quit without good cause or who have been discharged
for misconduct connected with the work have acted in a way most
people consider unreasonable. But when an individual has a socially
approved reason for leaving work or has been discharged for some act
not connected with his work, it cannot be said that his conduct is in-
consistent with a general willingness to work. Laws which restrict
good cause for quitting to causes attributable to the employer or con-
nected with the work have lost sight of the basic social purpose of
paying benefits to persons whose unemployment is due to lack of
suitable work. Such laws reflect a tendency to make the payment of
benefits dependent on a particular employer's fault in causing unem-
ployment&
While the causation theory is not a complete explanation of the
scope of the disqualifications, it is important in determining their
length. The length of disqualification provided by statute represents
the legislative judgment on the question of how long the initial cause
of the individual's unemployment continues to be the dominating
cause. In some states the law fixes an exact number of weeks;7 other
statutes give discretion to the state agency to fix the length of disquali-
fication in each case within prescribed minimum and maximum limits.'
While the question is one of judgment and is not susceptible to exact
proof, it would seem that, except for a brief period of unemployment
incidental to any change of jobs, the length of unemployment of an
individual who is seeking work is more likely to be due to labor market
conditions than to the reason for his separation from a previous job.
In a "buyer's market" employers might prefer not to hire a worker
who had voluntarily quit his job or been discharged for misconduct.
On the other hand, when there is a scarcity of labor, the worker's
6. See Harrison, Statutory Purpose and "Involuntary Unem ,oyrner," page 117
supra; Simrell, Employer Fault vs. Gewral Welfare as 11w Basis of ULnreploymmft Compmsa-
tion, page 181 infra.
7. As of the close of the 1943 legislative sessions, in the case of voluntary leaving,
21 state laws fixed a period ranging from one week to the entire period of unemployment
following the leaving; in the case of misconduct, fifteen states used a period ranging from
three weeks to the duration of unemployment following the discharge.
S. As of the close of the 1943 legislative sessions, in the case of voluntary leaving,
the maximum period ranged in 28 states from four to sixteen weeks; in the case of mis-
conduct, 34 states used a maximum varying from one to sLxteen weeks.
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record in that respect would not be apb to affect his chances of getting
a job. Thus the length of his unemployment is largely the result of
factors outside his control. Statutes imposing or permitting long
periods of disqualification penalize a worker who misjudges labor
market conditions and tend to reduce the mobility of labor. At the
present stage of public opinion a disqualification limited to four or,
at most, six weeks would seem economically and socially desirable.
Statutes which cancel wage credits and/or suspend benefit rights
of an individual who has voluntarily left his employment with or been
discharged for misconduct by an employer in his base period or any
employer whose experience rating account would otherwise be charged
with benefits are subject to criticism for looking at causation from the
viewpoint of the employer rather than of the employee. The fact that
an employer whose account would be charged with benefits paid a
claimant is not responsible for the latter's unemployment should not
determine the claimant's right to benefits? Statutes which apply an
extended waiting period from the time a claim is filed rather than
starting the disqualification period from the date of commission of the
disqualifying act have also misconceived the causation principle.
Such statutes are apparently based on the theory that, when an indi-
vidual quits without good cause or is discharged for misconduct, all
his unemployment, until he gets another job, is due either to his dis-
qualifying act or to the lack of suitable job opportunities and that
until he has been subjected to a period of exposure to job opportunities,
as evidenced by the filing of a claim, the disqualifying act continues
to be the cause of his unemployment. However, the possible reasons
for unemployment of an individual are more varied. The fact that
until he files a claim and registers for work he is not exposed to job
opportunities 1" does not mean that his unemployment continues to be
due to an act which may have occurred many weeks before. After the
limited period during which the disqualifying act can be considered
to be the principal cause of an individual's unemployment, other factors
become dominant. Where a claim has been filed, the dominating cause
may be lack of work; where, because the individual is ill or for some
other reason, no claim has been filed immediately following the separa-
tion from work, the dominating cause of his unemployment would
seem to be the illness or such other factor. After the disqualifying act
ceases to be the dominating cause of a claimant's unemployment,
whether or not his unemployment is due to lack of suitable work should
be tested by the availability requirement.
9. See Simrell, Employer Fault vs. General Welfare as the Basis of Unemployment Con-
pensation, page 181 infra.
10. Filing of a claim is of course not the only way an individual may expose himself
to job opportunities. He may seek work through his union, private employment agencies,
advertising, direct contacts with employers or in other ways,
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If the causation principle is followed logically, no disqualification
will result where the causal connection between the act and the un-
employment has been broken by intervening employment. A number
of statutes expressly provide that the voluntary-leaving and miscon-
duct disqualifications shall apply only to a leaving of the individual's
"most recent work" and a discharge for misconduct connected with
the individual's "most recent work," or that the individual shall be
disqualified only for consecutive weeks of unemployment immediately
following the quit or discharge for misconduct." In the absence of
express statutory provision, the purpose of the laws is best carried
out by applying a disqualification only when the original leaving or
discharge for misconduct continues to be the cause of the individual's
unemployment. When an individual has quit or been discharged for
misconduct, obtains another job, and then again becomes unemployed,
the question whether the original leaving or discharge continues to be
the dominating cause of the individual's unemployment can arise only
when the second job terminates within the maximum disqualification
period and within the period the first job would have continued. The
causal connection, of course, continues when surrounding circum-
stances indicate that the second job was a sham, or when the second
job was known by the individual to be temporary.1- In other cases
it would seem that the effect of leaving or being discharged from the
first job is too remote and speculative to have a reasonable relation to
the worker's later unemployment. 13 This is certainly true where a
worker leaves one job in order to accept a better offer which he believes
to be permanent and is later laid off for lack of work.
An understanding of the purpose of the disqualifications will go far
in preventing interpretations which are harsher than required by the
language of a particular statute, although in some states amendment
of the disqualification provisions, as recommended by the Council of
State Governments,' 4 will be necessary to insure the payment of com-
pensation for involuntary unemployment.
11. The second type of statute is preferable since a disqualification, even though
already assessed, is automatically terminated by intervening employment of a duration
such that in any week the claimant does not meet the statutory test of "unemployment."
12. But cf. Ben. Ser. 999-Pa. R (V2-2).
13. Ben. Ser. 7459-Mass. A (VS-7); Ben. Ser. 7S6S-Mich. A (V6-3), aff'd, MAich.App.
Bd., AD-8636-912 (unpublished).
14. See Couxcil, oF STATE Govnrnmrs, UNEMPLOYMIESNT COAP.;sATioz.; r. TaE
POSTWAR PERIOD (1944) 1:
"Each state should re-examine its statutory provisions governing disqualifica-
tions to be certain that the penalties imposed do not restrict the right of an indi-
vidual to change his work for good personal or family reasons, and that the manda-
tory character of penalties does not produce the unintended effect of denying com-
pensation to the involuntarily unemployed person who is able and Willing to work.
Specifically, it is recommended that penalties for disqualification entail the sus-
pension rather than the cancellation of benefit rights."
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Voluntary Leaving.
Any of the various forms of disqualification for voluntary leaving
may raise problems as to whether a particular separation was a "leav-
ing" of the individual's "work" and whether it was "voluntary." 16
Where there is no leaving or where it is involuntary, and a holding
that the disqualification is inapplicable can be based on the alternative
ground of good cause, it is of minor importance which ground is
adopted. But in jurisdictions which limit the good-cause justification,
a correct determination under the statute frequently requires close
analysis of the questions whether there actually was a "leaving" 10
of the individual's "work" and whether it was voluntary.
It is hardly subject to dispute that "leaving work" refers only to a
severance of the employment relation and does not include a temporary
interruption in the performance of services. Unemployment compensa-
tion is not concerned with employer-employee relations until the
worker becomes unemployed, and then only with acts which cause the
unemployment. An employee who is temporarily absent without
authorization may return to find that he has been discharged or that
there is no longer any work available. If he is discharged, a question
may arise as to whether the act constituted misconduct connected with
the work. If there is no longer work for him, his subsequent unem-
ployment is due to that cause and not to his prior absence. Accord-
ingly, benefit decisions hold that absence from the job is not a leaving
of "work" where the worker intends merely a temporary interruption
in the employment and not a severance of the employment relation."
There may, of course, be difficult questions of fact as to whether or
not the worker intended to sever the employment relation.
Webster defines "voluntary" as:
"1. Proceeding from the will, or from one's own choice or full
consent; produced in or by an act of choice; as voluntary action.
"2. Unconstrained by interference; unimpelled by another's
influence; spontaneous: acting of oneself or itself; free." 18
15. The Connecticut statute omits the word "voluntarily" and reads "left work with-
out sufficient cause which either is connected with his employment or is, solely by reason
of governmental regulation or statute, beyond his control . . . ." CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp.
1939) § 1339e(b)(2), as amended by GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1943) § 710g. At least one Connecti-
cut decision has relied on the omission of the word "voluntarily" in this section of the law.
Ben. Ser. 8148-Conn. R (V6-9). However, a California case construing the state labor
dispute disqualification furnishes precedent for reading the word "voluntarily" into tile
phrase "left work." Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Employment Comm., 17 Cal. (2d) 321, 109 P.
(2d) 935 (1941).
16. A "leaving" is the opposite of a discharge or lay-off and is also to be distinguished
from an expiration of the employment contract by its own terms. Ben. Ser. 7217-Colo.
A (V5-4); Ben. Ser. 4644-Iowa A (V3-10); Ben. Ser. 9110-W. Va. A (VS-1).
17. Ben. Ser. 7011-D.C. A (VS-2); Ben. Ser. 8218 Ind. A (V6-11); Ben. Ser. 7576-
Iowa A (V5-9).
18. WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed., unabridged, 1944).
VOLUNTARY LEAVING AND MISCONDUCT
It is clear that a leaving is not voluntary where a worker has no
choice but to sever his employment, as, for example, where the leaving
is necessary to comply with a governmental regulation,"0 or when the
worker has suffered an incapacitating illness or accident and is unable
to obtain a leave of absence.2 Benefit decisions have also held that a
worker's leaving is not voluntary when his reasons are so compelling
that he has no reasonable choice. The Massachusetts Board of Review
held that the claimant need not have been actually incapacitated at
the time she quit in order to make her leaving involuntary; it was
sufficient that poor health made a rest necessary to prevent a complete
breakdown. 21 Other cases have held that the claimant's leaving was
not voluntary when continuance in a particular job was rendered im-
possible or impracticable by the existence of a definite risk to health
or safety, 22 or by inability to obtain transportation,2 3 secure adequate
housing,24 or make a living at the job.2-
In considering whether an individual has good cause for leaving his
job, there is a large area which overlaps the disqualification for refusal
of suitable work. Nearly all statutes list certain criteria to be con-
sidered among other factors in determining the suitability of work -!
and some expressly provide that the same criteria shall be considered
in determining the existence of good cause for voluntary leaving.
Even without an express statutory provision, onq would expect that a
worker would not be disqualified for leaving worklwhich he might have
refused to accept on the ground of unsuitability. This is the usual
rule27 and is followed even under laws which limit good cause for vol-
19. Ben. Ser. 7983-R. I. A (V6-5) (induction into army); Ben. Ser. 7971-Havwaii
A (V6-5) (evacuation by military authorities); Ben. Ser. 7939-N.D. A (V6-5) (statute
abolishing home work).
20. Ben. Ser. 7866-N. H. R (V6-3); Ben. Ser. 6640-Ohio A (V4-11); Ben. Ser. 8602-
Texas A (V7-6); Ben. Ser. 8360-W. Va. A (V-1). In such circumstances an alternative
holding that there was no "leaving," since the separation was due to action of the employer
rather than of the employee, would be sound. There could be no disqualification for a dis-
charge since in such circumstances absence from work would not be misconduct.
21. Ben. Ser. 7822-Mass. R (V6-2).
22. Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 18 N. W. (2d) 249 (Minn. 1945); Ben. Sx.
7508-Colo. A (V5-9); Ben. Ser. 7567-Idaho R (VS-9); Ben. Ser. 3027-Mars. A (,3-3);
Mitchell v. Dixision of Unemployment Comp., Mass. D. C., Jan. 14, 1943, Ben. S&r. 8074-
Mass. Ct. D (V6-7); Ben. Ser. 7825-Mich. A (V6-2); Ben. Ser. 807?-Mich. R ,V6-7).
23. Ben. Ser. 8028-Mass. A (V6-6); Ben. Ser. 8356-N.C. A (V-1); Ben. Str. 7139-Pa.
A (VS-3), aff'd, Pa. Bd. of Rev., B-44-2RB-313 (unpublished); Ben. Ser. 8466-Wach.
A (V7-3).
24. Ben. Ser. 8564AW. Va. A (V7-5).
25. Ben. Ser. 7678-Ark. A (VS-li).
26. While the statutory disqualification for refusal of suitable worl: is limited (except
in Ohio) to refusals without good cause and the statutes thus apparently distinguish betw een
factors which make work unsuitable and factors which constitute good cause for refusal of
suitable work, in practice there is only slight distinction. See Menard, Refusal of Sutilaflfe
Work, page 134 supra.
27. Ben. Ser. 6471-Ind. A (V4-9); Ben. Ser. 3287-Maine A (V3-4); Ben. Sar. 1522-
Mich. A (V2-5); Ben. Ser. 4305-R. I. A (V3-8).
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untary leaving to causes attributable to the employer or in connection
with the work.2s To the extent that, under such laws, unsuitability
of the work is not held good cause for leaving, the disqualifications
or the applications of them are logically inconsistent.29
Many reasons in addition to those which make the work unsuitable
constitute good cause for leaving work. Some of these, such as an
impending lay-off,3" a substantial breach of contract by the employer,31
or a reasonable grievance against the employer,3 2 justify a leaving
even in states having limited good cause provisions. A large group of
socially approved reasons for leaving work, however, can relieve a
claimant of the disqualification only if personal good cause is recog-
nized. Examples are quitting because of illness or accident (where
not caused or aggravated by the physical conditions of the work), 3
to take care of a sick member of the family where the reason is not so
compelling as to make the leaving involuntary, 34 to retire,3" to take
another job,36 to attend a school or training course, 7 or to join one's
husband in another community.13
28. Ben. Ser. 8115-Ariz. R (V6-8); Ben. Ser. 7135-Colo, A (V5-3); Ben. Ser. 7922-
Mich. A (V6-4). In Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 18 N. W. (2d) 249, 252 (Minn.
1945), the Minnesota Supreme Court, in holding that a claimant who became seriously Ill
as a result of contact with gunpowder in her work had good cause attributable to the em-
ployer for leaving work, stated: ". . . Mason St. 1944 Supp. § 4337-27(E)(1), in prescrib-
ing rules for determining whether work is suitable for an unemployed individual, provides
that 'the director shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals,
his physical fitness * * *.' Under this section, a claimant cannot be disqualified for refusing
to accept employment which may be a risk to or endanger his health. If this be true, then
certainly it is unreasonable to hold that a clgimant must lose credits or be denied benefits
where he has been compelled to terminate enplyment because such employment has re-
sulted in a physical condition or disease likewise dangerous to health and personal safety."
29. An example of such inconsistency is Ben. Ser. 8069-Ala. R (V6-7) where a 17-
year-old girl was disqualified for quitting a job which required her to walk four blocks alone
after 1:00 a.m. from a streetcar line to her home but the Board of Appeals stated: "If such
a job as this claimant quit were offered to her again, she would surely have a right to refuse
it with good cause."
30. Ben. Ser. 7776-Conn. R (V6-1); Ben. Ser. 8826-Mich. A (V7-10), Ben. Ser. 4652-
Minn. A (V3-10); Ben. Ser. 4303-Ohio A (V3-8). Cf. Ben. Ser. 9312-Conn. R (V8-4).
31. Ben. Ser. 8117-Ky. R (V6-8) (failure to pay promised wage); Ben. Set. 8027-Mass.
A (V6-6) (failure to furnish transportation as agreed).
32. Ben. Ser. 8190-Iowa A (V6-10) (arbitrary deduction of day's pay); Ben. Ser.
8120-N. Y. R (V6-8) (discrimination in promotions); Ben. Ser. 7925-Ohio A (V6-4) (refusal
of pass to dispensary); Ben. Ser. 7979-Ohio A (V6-5) (refusal of promised leave of absence).
33. Ben. Ser. 7916-Conn. R (V6-4).
34. Ben. Ser. 8662-Cal. R (V7-8); Ben. Ser. 7069-Neb. R (VS-2); Ben. Ser. 7403-
W. Va. A (V5-6).
35. Ben. Ser. 8026-Maine A (V6-6).
36. Ben. Ser. 8903-La. A (V7-11); Ben. Ser. 8024-Maine A (V6-6); Ben. Ser. 8040-
S.D. R (V6-6).
37. Ben. Ser. 7815-Cal. R (V6-2); Ben. Ser. 7817-Fla. A (V6-2); Ben. Ser. 7826-
Mich. A (V6-2); Ben. Ser. 8088-N.J. R (V6-8); Ben. Ser. 7976-N.Y. R (V6-5).
38. Teicher Unemployment Comp. Case, 154 Pa. Super. 250, 35 A. (2d) 739 (1944),
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It is sometimes contended that the objectives of unemployment
compensation require that good cause for a severance of the employ-
ment relationship by the voluntary act of the claimant be limited to
causes attributable to the employer or having some connection with
the employment. Cases that have read such a limitation into the
statutory language 9 have taken what seems to be an unjustifiably re-
strictive view of the purposes of unemployment compensation. The
main argument is that the statutory declaration of public policy
states the objectives to be the protection of workers and of the state
against the consequences of involuntary unemploent by compelling
the setting aside of reserves to be used for the benefit of persons who
become unemployed through o .fazlt of their own.11 By the usual rules
of statutory construction, a general declaration of policy may be used
to explain but not to contradict specific provisions of the act.4' Juris-
dictions following this rule have refused to read into their statutes
any restriction on good cause for voluntary leaving.42 Moreover, as
brought out in the introductory section of this article, the recognition
of good personal cause is consistent with the reference to "involun-
tary unemployment" and persons "unemployed through no fault of
their own" in the statutory declarations of public policy, while refusal
to recognize good personal cause is inconsistent with the general pur-
pose of unemployment compensation. The recognition of good cause
attributable to the employer shows that a strictly logical classification
of unemployment as voluntary or involuntary is not the basic test of
compensability. The same sort of social considerations which require
the recognition of good cause attributable to the employer necessitate
the recognition of good personal cause.
Ben. Ser. 8560-Pa. Ct. D (V7-5); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Board of Rev., Cool: Cy.
C. C., April 5, 1941, Ben. Ser. 6577-Ill. Ct. D (V4-10).
39. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Society v. Olsen, 141 Neb. 776, 4 N. A. (2d) 923
(1942), Ben. Ser. 7730-Neb. Ct. D (X5-12); John Morrell & Co. v. Unemployment Comp.
Comm., 13 N. W. (2d) 498 (S. D. 1944), Ben. Ser. 8859-S.D. Ct. D (V7-10); O'Neil Co. v.
Board of Rev., Ohio Ct. of C. P., Summit Cy., March 12, 1940, Ben. SEr. 4822-Ohio Ct.
D (V-1I).
40. Such statements are found in at least eighteen statutes. In addition at lea~t eight
acts refer to "involuntary unemployment" as the evil to be remedied, and tvo acts cpsa!:
of benefits for persons "unemployed through no fault of their ovn." However, eight tatutes
do not qualify the unemployment to be compensated by any such phras s and tw elve acts
contain no declaration of public policy.
41. 2 SuTHEnA D, STATuTEs ANm STATuToRy Co,,sTrcrTo. (2d ed. 1904) § 341;
BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF L.wws (2d ed. 1911) § 84; Lauf v. E. G.
Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938); In re Steelman, 219 N. C. 306, 13 S. E. (2d) 544 (1941).
42. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Board of Rev., Ill. C. C., Cool: Cy., April 5,
1941, Ben. Ser. 6577-Ill. Ct. D (V4-10); Teicher Unemployment Comp. Ca-e, 154 Pa.
Super. 250, 35 A. (2d) 739 (1944), Ben. Ser. 8560-Pa. Ct. D (V7-5); Ben. S.r. 2314-Conn.
R (V2-12); Ben. Ser. 4802-Fla. A (V3-11); Ben. Ser. 6107-Kan. A (V4-7); Ben. S.r. 6212-




The unintended social and economic evils which would result from
reading restrictive words into the good cause provision have been
aptly stated in an Illinois court decision4 3 in these words:
"Primarily, this *sort of legislation is intended as a form of insur-
ance against the rigors and hardships of unemployment, and noth-
ing in this Act ought to be construed in such a way as to give em-
ployers advantages over their employees which they would not have
but for this Act.
"Altogether too often, ameliorative measures, remedial measures,
whose objects were known definitely by the legislature, become
through strained construction, instruments detrimental to the very
interests that the legislation aimed to protect. If the good grounds
here spoken of were to be construed to mean grounds arising solely
out of the employment itself, the Act in question would become a
means of compelling servitude under the penalty of forfeiting cer-
tain benefits that are now granted by law to all citizens.
"It is no answer to say that in the absence of this legislation those
benefits would not exist. Now they do exist. If these benefits could
be taken from an employee simply because under the compulsion of
domestic or personal conditions he leaves his employment, then the
worker who relies upon these benefits, who finds in them a measure
of security during the periods of unemployment would indirectly be
tied to his job, compelled to hold it even under conditions which all
reasonable men agree would justify his separating himself from it.
Instead of being the remedial measure that is approved by all right
thinking men, it would turn out to be a club in the hands of certain
employers. It would tie the employee to his job. The employer
could virtually say to him, 'This job is inconvenient. Your own do-
mestic situation, or your health, or other good causes counsel that
you should abandon this job, but if you do, you will be deprived of
the benefits which now under the law go to all workers who are
without their fault unemployed.' I can't lend myself to the giving
of such a construction to the Act."
Where good personal cause is recognized, the only requirement is
that the claimant have acted as a reasonable person would have acted
in the light of all the circumstances. 44 These circumstances may in-
clude not only practical and financial incentives, such as an individual
might have in obtaining or fitting himself for a better job, but purely
psychological or emotional factors as well. As was stated by the
Pennsylvania court in a recent case holding that a wife had good
cause when she left her employment to join her soldier husband in
another community:
43. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Board of Rev., Ill. C. C., Cook Cy., April 5, 1941,
Ben. Ser. 6577-I11. Ct. D (V4-10).
44. Ben. Ser. 8754-Ill. R (V7-9) (leaving to look after property in which life's savings
were invested); Ben. Ser. 8781-Pa. R (V7-9) (leaving because of unsatisfactory living condi-
tions); Ben. Ser. 9098-R.I. R (V8-1) (leaving because of reduction in wages).
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"It is difficult to conceive of a cause more impelling, more hu-
manly justifiable, than the impulse which induces a devoted wife
to spend with a husband, who is a member of the Armed Forces in
time of war, what may prove to be the last days they shall ever have
together on earth." 45
It is not anticipated that conversion from wartime to peacetime
economy will create any special problems in the field of voluntary quit.
There will be new variations in fact situations but no change in applica-
ble principles. Some workers will undoubtedly quit war jobs in order
to seek greater security in lines of work devoted to peacetime needs.
If a lay-off is known to be imminent, it may be found that the worker
has good cause connected with the work;G at any rate the quit Nill
cease to be the cause of the unemployment as of the time lay-off would
have occurred. Other workers who have moved to distant parts of
the country in order to take war jobs may quit to return to their homes
although their employer has converted to peacetime production and
can continue to furnish employment. In some such cases distance
from relatives or home property, after the special conditions due to
the war have ceased, may make the job left unsuitable for the indi-
vidual and thus constitute good cause connected w\ith the work. In
other cases additional factors, such as a reasonable prospect of work
in the home community, would be necessary in order to find good
cause.
Another situation which is likely to occur frequently in the con-
version period and afterwards is a reduction in wages, or at least in
take-home pay by the elimination of overtime. Whether a reduction
in wages constitutes good cause for quitting depends upon considera-
tion of all the circumstances in each case. Some of the factors to be
considered are: the reasons for the reduction, whether it was a breach
of contract, 47 whether it was applied to all employees of the claimant's
class, whether the employer gave notice of the decrease,42 whether the
decrease was substantial,49 and the individual's prospects for work at
a higher wage. Regardless of other factors, a worker has good cause
for quitting when the reduced wage is less than the legal minimum, 0
less than the prevailing wage5' or less than a living wage. ,52
45. Teicher Unemployment Comp. Case, 154 Pa. Super. 250, 35 A. (2d) 739 (1944),
Ben. Ser. 8560-Pa. Ct. D (V7-5).
46. See note 30 supra.
47. Held good cause in Ben. Ser. 8117-Ky. R (V6-8). Cf. Ben. Ser. 8S37-N.Y. R (V7-
10) (increase in working hours i.th no increase in pay).
48. Ben. Ser. 7079-Ohio A (VS-2) (reduction without advance notice held good caus,-).
49. Held good cause in Ben. Ser. 8407-Il. R (V7-2); Ben. Ser. 5147-Macs A (V4-1);
Ben. Ser. 8245-Mich. A (V6-11); Ben. Ser. 8037-R.I. A (V6-6); Ben. Ser. 70S0-R.I. A
(VS-2).
50. Ben. Ser. 5321-Minn. A (X74-2).
51. Ben. Ser. 5135-Fla. A (V4-1).




A determination that a claimant has been discharged for misconduct
connected with the work involves four distinct findings: (1) that the
claimant did the act alleged; (2) that the claimant was discharged;
(3) that the act was the reason for the discharge; and, (4) that the
act was "misconduct connected with the work."
1. Finding that claimant did act alleged. Mere general allegations of
misconduct are not sufficient." Proof of a specific act is necessary.
A variation from ordinary problems of proof before an administra-
tive body may be presented where a prior adjudication before a court
or other administrative body has determined the question of commis-
sion of the act. Since the unemployment' compensation body has the
duty under its statute of making the determination for unemployment
compensation purposes, a determination by another body cannot be
conclusive. 54 However, such a determination may be admitted in
evidence where relevant and material. The test of relevancy is whether
the former judgment decided the question at issue in the unemploy-
ment compensation hearing. For example, on the issue of disqualifica-
tion for misconduct on the basis of a particular act for which the
claimant has been prosecuted, a conviction is at least some evidence
of commission of the act although not that the act constitutes mis-
conduct connected with the work. 5 If the conviction has been ob-
tained on a plea of guilty, the plea would be admissible in a court of
law as an admission, subject of course to explanation. 5 If the prior
determination is found to be relevant and thus admitted, it would
seem that the claimant should always be given an opportunity to
explain it or to introduce rebutting evidence. The exclusion of mate-
rial evidence resulting in prejudice to the appellant is ground for
reversal of an administrative determination upon review by a court
because of failure to grant a fair hearing. In other words, a determi-
53. Ben. Ser. 356-Wis. A (V1-3).
54. Ben. Ser. 8488-Minn. A (V7-4).
55. Ben. Ser. 6162-Tex. A (V4-7); Brit. Ump. 4569/26, Ben. Ser. (Gen. Supp. 1)
BU-138; Brit. Ump. 98/28, Ben. Ser. (Gen. Supp. 1) BU-151; Brit. Limp. 5578/35, Ben.
Ser. (Gen. Supp. 1) BU-120; Brit. Omp. 292/42.
56. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 1042; 2 BLACK. JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1902)
§ 529; 34 C. J. 972 (1924).
57. People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Orange, 251
N. Y. 156, 172, 167 N. E. 204, 211 (1929), stating: "Though technical legal rules of evidence
and procedure may be disregarded by administrative boards, when they act in a quasi-
judicial capacity, yet they must preserve the rights of those appearing before them to an
adequate and fair hearing, and must act upon evidence which has some probative force."
Accord: People ex rel. Packwood v. Riley, 232 N. Y. 283, 133 N. E. 891 (1922); People
ex rel. Fallon v. Wright, 7 App. Div. 185, 40 N. Y. S. 285 (1st Dep't 1896), aff'd, 150 N. Y.
444, 44 N. E. 1036 (1896); Petak v. R. H. Macy & Co., 254 App. Div. 617, 3 N. Y. S. (2d)
71 (3d Dep't 1938).
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nation by another body is never conclusive in the sense that other
evidence can be excluded or disregarded.
2. Finding tMat claimant was discharged. The ordinary meaning of a
discharge is a severance of the employment relation by the employer.
However, where a worker has quit in anticipation of certain discharge
(other than for lack of work -), it is more reasonable to consider the
termination of employment a discharge than a voluntary quit." The
worker would then be disqualified only if the other elements of the
disqualification for misconduct are present. The term "discharge"
would not seem to include a suspension of a workero although a num-
ber of statutes include suspensions for misconduct among the grounds
for disqualification.
3. Finding that act was reason for discharge. As in the case of com-
mission of the act, there is no disagreement over the legal content of
the requirement, that a causal connection exist between the discharge
and the claimant's act, and the only problem is one of proof. The
determining body must be satisfied that the act stated to be the ground
for the discharge was the true reason and not a mere pretext."'
During the war the shortage of labor has had a tendency to reduce
the number of discharges for trivial reasons. As competition for jobs
becomes greater with the return of servicemen, there will be a tempta-
tion for employers to assign misconduct as the reason for termination
of an individual's employment. Whether the termination was actually
due to lack of work can usually be determined by whether or not the
worker has been replaced. But some cases of replacement will be due
to seniority rights, availability of more efficient workers, or pure
favoritism, and a careful examination of the facts will be necessary in
order to determine the real reason for the discharge.
4. Finding that act was "misconduct connected with the wort." The
last and most troublesome question is whether the act constituted
misconduct connected with the work. Acts which employers deem
grounds for discharge range from breakage of an expensive machine
or commission of a felony to a few minutes tardiness, smoking on the
job, or failure to wear specified clothing. Unemployment compensa-
tion laws do not attempt to tell employers when they may or may not
58. An imminent lay-off is good cause for a voluntary quit. See note 30 supra.
59. Ben. Ser. 1814-R.I. A (V2-7) (carelessness); Ben. Ser. 6586-Ohio R (V4-10)
(marriage); Ben. Ser. 5333-Tex. R (V4-2) (non-payment of union dues).
60. Stitt v. Locomotive Engineers' Mutual Protective Assn. 177 Mich. 207, 142 N. W.
1110 (1913); Markey v. Schunk, 152 Iowa 50S, 132 N. NV. 883 (1911). But see Ben. Sr.
1710-Ind. A (V2-7) applying a "discharge" disqualification to a suspension
61. It is not necessary that the miEconduct or reason for the discharge conict of a
single act. The act which occasions the discharge may be the culmination of a ceric-, no
one of which alone would be sufficient, but which taken together constitute misconduct
connected with the work. Checker Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm., 242 Wis. 429, 8 S. W.
(2d) 286 (1943), Ben. Ser. 8062-Wis. Ct. D (V6-7); Ben. Ser. 8137-Wis. A (V6-9).
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discharge workers; but the disqualification for a discharge applies
only when that discharge was due to the worker's misconduct con-
nected with his work. Because the consequences to the claimant are
serious and the grounds for discharge often trivial, it is important that
the determining body weigh carefully the question whether the act
constitutes misconduct connected with the work.
An attempt to break down the concept of misconduct connected
with the work into two parts, "misconduct" and "connected with the
work," is in most instances not particularly helpful. The dictionary
definition of misconduct is wrong or improper behavior. Behavior can
be wrongful only in relation to some standard. For the purpose of the
misconduct disqualification, that standard is to a large extent em-
bodied in the limitation "connected with the work."
In the field of inefficiency and ordinary negligence, however, the
applicable standard must be supplied from the general purpose of
unemployment compensation rather than from the phrase "connected
with the work." It is well established that inefficiency or ordinary
negligence is not misconduct. The purpose of unemployment com-
pensation requires that the disqualification be limited to intentional
acts or negligence of equal culpability. As stated by the Wisconsin
court:
"If mere mistakes, errors in judgment or in the exercise of discre-
tion, minor and but casual or unintentional carelessness or negli-
gence, and similar minor peccadilloes must be considered to be
within the term 'misconduct,' and no such element as wantonness,
culpability or wilfulness with wrongful intent or evil design is to be
included as an essential element in order to constitute misconduct
within the intended meaning of the term as used in the statute, then
there will be defeated, as to many of the great mass of less capable
industrial workers, who are in. the lower income brackets and for
whose benefit the act was largely designed, the principal purpose
and object under the act of alleviating the evils of unemployment
by cushioning the shock of a lay-off, which is apt to be most serious
to such workers." 62
Any argument that the misconduct disqualification is intended to
prevent the payment of benefits to persons who have violated the
criminal statutes or generally accepted moral standards is refuted by
an analysis of the terms of the disqualification. Under the statutes,
commission of an act of misconduct does not disqualify the claimant.
There must have been a discharge by the employer because of that
act. No matter how serious an individual's offense, the unemploy-
ment compensation law is not concerned with it in an instance where
the employer has condoned the offense and later discharged the indi-
62. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 258-9, 296 N. W. 636, 640 (1941),
Ben. Ser. 6310-Wis. Ct. D (V4-8).
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vidual for lack of work. Moreover, it cannot be overemphasized that
the disqualification is not for misconduct in general but for a particular
kind of misconduct-nisconduct connected with the work. 3
By what standard, then, is a worker's conduct to be measured? The
standard to be applied is that of the employment contract, express or
implied, which fixes the worker's duties in connection with his work.
Since conduct can be wrong only when it violates a duty to act other-
wise, benefit decisions have held that an essential element of mis-
conduct connected with the work is a breach of duty to the employerC4
On the other hand, breach of a duty to the employer does not alone
make the act one "connected with the work" 11 in the statutory sense.
Certainly it would be inconsistent with the policy of the unemploy-
ment compensation laws to permit an employer to connect any be-
havior with the work simply by obtaining an express promise from the
employee not to engage in that type of behavior. Even duties which
would be implied from the employment relation are not necessarily
connected with the work within the meaning of the statutory dis-
qualification. Whether or not they are part of the employment con-
tract, rules for conduct off the job and off the premises are generally
rules of selection or, as sometimes stated, conditions of employment.s
They merely state the policy of the employer in respect to the hiring
and retention of workers and give notice that workers whose retention
63. That unemployment compensation laws are not intended to supplement the
criminal statutes or regulate morals was well put by a South Carolina Appeal Tribunal,
Ben. Ser. 1985-S.C. A (V2-9), in holding that intoxication outside worhing hours is not
ground for disqualification:
"Inasmuch as it does not appear to have been the intent of the legislature to
create by the passage of the Unemployment Compensation Act a law regulating the
morals of employees or supplementing the functions of regularly constituted peace
officers within the State, it appears that moral considerations or breach of statute
or ordinance not directly connected with employment are not ,,ithin the purview of
the Act as disqualifying factors."
Reaching the same conclusion in a similar situation, Ben. Ser. 3685-N.C. R (V3-6),
the North Carolina Unemployment Compensation Commission Eaid:
"The utterance of truisms and gilded generalities on the evils of drink doas
not solve the problem. The matter is entirely objective, and the personal predilec-
tions, prejudices, and experiences of the investigator should not affect the rights of
any of the interested parties. The Unemployment Compensation Law should not
be converted into a beverage-control and an indirect prohibition law, however much
we like good morals and right living; nor can we act [set] ourselves up as the moral
arbiters of a mill community with the granting or withholding benefits as a club."
64. Boynton Cab Co. v. Newbeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N. W. 636 (1941), Ben. Ser.
6310-Wis. Ct. D (V=3); Ben. Ser. 7182-Iowa A (VS-4); Ben. Ser. M099-Fla. A (V6-S);
Ben. Ser. 5268-Tex. A (V4-2); Ben. Ser. 7537-Coio. A (VS-9).
65. As already shown, the act must be wilful or culpably negligent. See page 162 supra.
The breach of duty must also be a material one. Ben. Ser. 7182-Iowa A (V5-4).
66. Ben. Ser. 3182-N.C. R (V3-4); Ben. Ser. 7537-Colo. A (VS-9). See notes 70 and
71 infra (rules that workers will be discharged for arrest or wage garnishment).
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is inconsistent with the rules will be dismissed. It is immaterial that
compliance or noncompliance with the conditions is in the control of
the worker. An employee who fails to apply for citizenship papers in
accordance with conditions imposed by the employer,"7 or a woman
who marries knowing that her employer does not employ married
women and that she will be discharged, is not disqualified for mis-
conduct connected with the work Is any more than an employee who
is separated because he reaches an age above that fixed by company
rules.69 Rules that a worker who is arrested 70 or whose wages are
subjected to garnishment 11 will be discharged are also rules of selec-
tion.
It may be anticipated that rules of selection will play a more promi-
nent part in benefit determinations during the postwar period than in
previous years. As the reserve of unemployed persons becomes larger,
employers tend to impose stricter job qualifications. Rules against the
employment of married women and of persons above a certain age
are especially likely to spring up during a depression period. Support
for such rules is not always confined to employers. Because employers
frequently allege misconduct in cases of discharge for failure to comply
with rules of selection, claims-determining bodies will probably be
called upon with increasing frequency to distinguish betveen rules of
this character and rules of conduct.
The distinction between acts which may be justifiable grounds for
discharge and acts which fall within the statutory disqualification as
misconduct is well illustrated by a recent Florida case. An inspector
in a plant making airplane parts had been discharged for falsifying
questionnaires and applications for gasoline rationing. The employer
argued that the misrepresentations were misconduct because they
67. See Ohio Ref. Dec. 808-Ref-42, May 1, 1942, CCH Unemployment Ins. Serv.'-
Ohio 1970.016; Ohio Bd. of Rev. Dec. 25-BR-43, Jan. 13, 1943, ibid.
68. Ben. Ser. 492-Wis. A (VI-4); Ben. Ser. 2615-Mo. A (V3-1); Ben, Ser. 2623-Ohio
A (V3-1); Ben. Ser. 3348-Iowa A (V3-5); Ben. Ser. 3530-Ohio A (V3-5); Ben. Ser. 4154-Cal.
(V3-8); Ben. Ser. 6586-Ohio R (V4-10); Ben. Ser. 6550-Okla. A (V4-10).
69. Compare misrepresentation of age in securing employment as not constituting
misconduct. Ben. Ser. 3669-Mo. A (V3-6). Even if such a misrepresentation be considered
misconduct connected with the work, it is not the cause of the unemployment.
70. Ben. Ser. 3182-N.C. R (V3-4); Ben. Ser. 3683-N.C. R (V3-6); Ben. Ser. 5603-
Tex. A (V4-4); Ben. Ser. 8171-Conn. R (V6-10). There may be some exceptional circum-
stances where a worker who is detained in jail could be found to be absent from work with-
out good cause and therefore disqualified for misconduct connected with the work. In the
ordinary situation, however, the causal connection between the commission of a criminal
act and the subsequent absence from work due to arrest is too remote to justify a holding
that the absence was wilful.
71. Ben. Ser. 605-N.Y. A (V1-5); Ben. Ser. 2448-Maine A (V3-1); Ben. Ser. 3684-
N.C. A (V3-6); Ben. Ser. 5375-Kan. A (V4-3); Ben. Ser. 2937-Ohio A (V3-3); Ben. Ser.
7760-Ohio A (V6-1); Ben. Ser. 8330-Mich. R (V7-1). Contra: Ben. Ser. 1081-Ind. A (V2-3);
Ben. Ser. 7537-Coio. A (V5-9); Ben. Ser. 4152-Ala. A (V3-8).
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related to the claimant's fitness as a suitable employee in the capacity
in which he was employed. An order of disqualification was reversed
on appeal to the Board of Review.72 The Board stated:
"It is for the administrative agencies to determine whether the
misconduct is actually 'connected with the work' as that term im-
plies. The prerogative of an employer to conduct his business as he
pleases, to make any lawful rules and regulations regarding the
operation of his establishment, and to hire and fire employees under
any circumstances and as he chooses, is readily acknowledged.
However, if behavior 'is not related to or connected with the work,
then a rule cannot make it so, nor can it supply the necessary ele-
ment required by Statute.' ...
"The misconduct alleged in the present case, no matter how seri-
ous, has not been shown to have occurred at the premises of the
employer, or to have been of such a nature as to be detrimental to
the employer's interests. Neither does it appear that the conduct
in any way affected claimant's ability to perform his customary
work in any less efficient manner than heretofore and we can but
hold that the misconduct was not actually 'connected with his
work' as that term implies."
The theory urged by the employer in the Florida case, that mis-
conduct, although not occurring in the course of the employment,
may be connected with the work if it evidences unsuitability for the
work and makes retention of the worker incompatible with the em-
ployer's interests, seems unsound. "Suitability" is not a good test of
connection with the work. It is a vague term and much broader in
meaning than "connected with the work." Reasonable specifications
of suitability for the job shade gradually into purely arbitrary require-
ments. To adopt the suitability theory would mean either accepting
without question the judgment of employers as to what acts indicate
qualification for a particular job or the determination by the agency
in each case of what qualifications are reasonable. It may be reason-
able to require that a bank teller not play the stock market on margin
while in other jobs such a qualification would be entirely irrelevant,
but there will be many intermediate cases which present close ques-
tions. In the same way, requirements as to marital status, age, se%,
race, or creed are often purely arbitrary, but may in other instances
have some relation to the job.
Standards of moral conduct would require particularly difficult
determinations. A salesman for a public utility in a town of 5,000 who
was seen drinking in public and traveling about with women other
than his wife 73 and a traveling representative of a livestock commis-
sion firm who was addicted to the use of intoxicating liquor and lived
72. Ben. Ser. 7900-Fla. A (V6-4).
73. Ben. Ser. 3930-Tex. A (V3-7).
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for a time with a woman not his wife 71 were disqualified for conduct
causing the employing company loss of good will and reflecting on its
reputation. The preferable view that misconduct which does not take
place in the course of the employment is not connected with the em-
ployee's work even though it may affect the employer's business ad-
versely is illustrated by decisions in Maryland and Ohio refusing to
disqualify a theater usher who was "involved with" girls on probation
from reform school 75 and a truck driver for a department store who
was convicted of window peeping. 7 In a well-considered Texas case
an employee of a company operating an oil well had been convicted
of theft of joints of pipe belongiA'g to a pipe line company operating on
the same land. The commission held, reversing the initial determina-
tion, that no disqualification could be invoked "because the miscon-
duct, if any, was not committed against the employer, nor was it
committed while claimant was engaged in performing services for his
employer, nor was it in any way connected with his employment," "1
The concept of connection with the work is one which can best be
delimited by the gradual process of inclusion or exclusion as the cases
arise, rather than by an attempt to frame a precise definition. Circum-
stances to be considered are whether the act occurred during the hours
of employment, whether it occurred on the employer's premises,
whether it occurred while the employee was engaged in his work, and
whether the employee took advantage of the employment relation in
order to commit the act. However, the presence or absence of any one
of these circumstances is not conclusive. Above all, as the Florida
Board of Review has made clear, neither violation of the employer's
rules nor failure to meet the employer's standards of suitability for the
job can be accepted as determinative of misconduct connected with the
work.
74. Ben. Ser. 4891-S.D. A (V3-12).
75. Ben. Ser. 1863-Md. A (V2-8).
76. Ben. Ser. 2058-Ohio A (V2-10). See also Ben. Ser. 92-Wis. A (VI-1) (act of inde-
cency by truck driver); Ben. Ser. 2147-N.Y. R (V2-11) (sex offense by doorman of cloth-
ing store); Ben. Ser. 2859-Ind. A (V3-3) (incest).
77. Ben. Ser. 5268-Tex. A (N74-2). If the evidence in this case had shown that the
worker took advantage of his employment relation to gain access to the premises or knowl-
edge enabling him to commit the theft, the act might have been found connected with the
work'on that ground.
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